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Understanding Compulsory Schooling Legislation: 
A Formal Model and Implications for Empirical Analysis
* 
 
We construct a simple model of compulsory schooling in which legislation and compliance 
are endogenously determined by individuals disciplined by social norms, optimizing their 
voting decisions and the school attendance of their children. The model provides a formal 
framework for interpreting empirical results on the effect of compulsory-schooling legislation 
(CSL) on enrollment. This sheds light on the use of CSL as an instrumental variable to 
identify the benefits of schooling, suggesting how the estimates it produces may be biased. 
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1. Introduction 
There is increased interest in compulsory-schooling legislation (CSL) as an instrument for 
identifying the benefits of schooling.
1 Studies in this vein see it as causing an exogenous 
increase in schooling among those who would otherwise have dropped out at an earlier age: a 
treatment  effect,  interpretation  of  which  does  not  require  a  behavioral  model.  However, 
substantial  evidence  of  the  weak  effect  of  CSL  on  enrollment,  described  below,  and  the 
obviously  endogenous  nature  of  both  legislation  and  enrollment,  suggest  that  a  formal 
framework may help untangle these effects and allow a clearer understanding of the empirical 
evidence.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  construct  such  a  model,  which  endogenizes 
compulsory schooling legislation and compliance, and consider its implications for empirical 
analysis.  
Empirical studies on the effect of compulsory-schooling legislation on enrollment, 
though far from uniform in their findings, have generally failed to reveal the strong effects 
that  one  might  expect  such  legislation  to  have,  and  which  are  implicit  in  its  use  as  an 
instrument  for  schooling.  West’s  (1971,  1978)  careful  historical  analysis  of  education  in 
nineteenth-century Britain is especially emphatic in its conclusion that the 1870 Education 
Act,  which  introduced  compulsory  education  in  Britain,  had  “negligible  effect”  on 
subsequent  literacy  rates  (West,  1978,  p.  382);  and  an  econometric  study  of  compulsory 
schooling in the United States in the 1880s by Landes and Solmon (1972) similarly failed to 
detect robust effects. Both studies describe an autonomous process of increased levels of 
education and literacy over time driven by individual motives on which legislation had no 
significant effect.  
More recent studies of later periods—by Oreopoulos (2006a) on Canada over most of   3  
the twentieth century, by Goldin and Katz (2008) on the high school movement in the United 
States between 1910-40, by Lleras Muney (2002) on the United States between 1920-40—
found  legislation  to  have  a  statistically  significant,  though  weak  effect  on  enrollment.  In 
Goldin  and  Katz’s  (2008,  p.5)  words,  “the  effect  was  modest,  at  best,  especially  in 
comparison  with  the  increase  in  high-school  enrollments  and  overall  educational 
attainment.”
2  
Taken together these two sets of studies suggest that the measured effect of CSL on 
enrollment  increased  between  the  late  nineteenth  and  mid-twentieth  century.  There  are 
various possible explanations for this change. It could be viewed as part of a general trend 
towards  greater  compliance  observed  also  in  other  fields  of  public  policy,  possibly 
attributable to improvements in the machinery of government as a result of technological 
improvements in transportation and communications, or to changes in social mores as a result 
of  industrialization  and  urbanization;  or  it  could  be  the  consequence  of  extension  of  the 
franchise to lower-income households, as a result of which CSL came to be more closely 
aligned with the interests of the social classes whose actions it was meant to affect, so there 
was less motivation for truancy.
3 In addition, more recent studies have had access to better 
data,  which  should  allow  better  separation  and  identification  of  the  different  effects.
4  
Ignoring underlying trends of increased household demand for education and higher levels of 
compliance exaggerates the effect of CSL on enrollment. As Goldin and Katz write, “The 
potential  endogeneity  of  law  changes  to  other  (unmeasured)  determinants  of  increased 
schooling  suggests  our  approach  is  likely  to  overestimate  the  “causal”  impacts  of  law 
changes.” And the same may be said of the endogeneity of compliance. 
Angrist and his co-authors (Angrist and Krueger, 1991, Angrist et al., 1996, Imbens 
and  Angrist,  1994),  who  pioneered  the  use  of  compulsory  schooling  legislation  as  an   4  
instrument  to  identify  schooling  effects  from  micro-data,  are  explicit  in  explaining  the 
limitations of this approach. Borrowing their vocabulary from the medical statistics literature, 
they stress that CSL cannot identify the average treatment effect (ATE) of schooling on the 
population in general but only the local average treatment effect (LATE): its effect on those 
children who would not have gone to school absent CSL but who attended school following 
enactment  of  CSL.  To  estimate  this  effect  there  is  a  counter-factual  that  needs  to  be 
constructed, and success in this effort depends on several assumptions holding true. 
Low compliance with CSL rates raises two separate issues in this regard. The first is 
that it renders CSL a weak instrument for identifying schooling effects. The second is the 
possibility of biased estimates, which may arise if compliance is correlated with unmeasured 
social and psychological traits that are likely to affect the benefits of schooling—say, if one 
were estimating the effect of schooling on the child’s future earnings and the underlying 
mechanism  driving  compliance  were  correlated  with  future  earnings.  This  might  be  a 
consequence of the way CSL changes the significance of education decisions: it is one thing 
not to send one’s child to school beyond the required age; it is quite another to keep one’s 
child from school in defiance of the law. Parents in the latter category are thus likely to have 
greater respect for the law and ability to accept authority, and if this is passed on to their 
children  and  has  a  generally  positive  effect  on  earnings,  compliance  will  be  positively 
correlated  with  future  earnings.  Under  these  conditions,  using  CSL  as  an  instrument  to 
identify schooling effects will overestimate the impact of schooling on earnings.
5 
  To  demonstrate  these  issues  we  construct  in  this  paper  a  simple  political  economy 
model  of  compulsory  schooling  with  endogenous  legislation  and  compliance  in  which 
individuals  disciplined  by  social  norms  optimize  their  voting  decisions  and  the  school 
attendance  of  their  children.  The  analysis  assumes  that  education  generates  an  external   5  
benefit, which provides motivation for voters to support (some) free compulsory schooling 
for all.
6 Truancy carries a social penalty determined by a social compliance norm, and parents 
must  decide  individually  on  the  extent  of  their  compliance  with  the  legislated  level  of 
compulsory schooling. Keeping their children from school and sending them out to work 
increases the family’s current consumption at the expense of the child’s future income, as 
well as incurring an immediate social penalty that varies directly with the extent of the child’s 
truancy. 
  The notion that the  enforcement of compulsory schooling depends on  social norms 
rather  than  on  legal  penalties  reflects  the  practical  difficulty  of  enforcing  compulsory 
schooling through legal means. It is generally the very poor who keep their children from 
school so as to send them to work, and there is little that can be done by way of fines or 
incarceration that would not further harm the same children that compulsory schooling is 
meant to benefit. The most extreme punishment is the removal of truant children from their 
parents’ custody, but this too may, of course, be harmful to the child, and the anguish it 
causes the parents may be tempered if they see it as alleviating the child’s poverty. This 
leaves  social  norms  as  the  principal  means  of  enforcement,  norms  that  are  shaped  by 
ingrained cultural variables and vary over time: in poorer societies the need to send one’s 
children to work from a young age is more widespread, more easily understood, and hence 
more acceptable.  
In  equilibrium,  the  enrollment  rate  is  determined  by  the  distribution  of  household 
income and by the social penalty for truancy, and comparative-statics analysis reveals how 
the legislated level of compulsory schooling is affected by this social penalty and by income 
levels.  Empirical  analyses  of  the  effect  of  CSL  on  enrollment  over  time  that  ignore  the 
positive  association  of  legislation  with  factors  that  positively  affect  schooling  levels  will   6  
produce upwardly biased estimates of the effect of legislation on enrollment, as some of the 
increase would have been achieved without legislation. Empirical analyses that use CSL to 
identify the benefits of education from individual data but ignore cross-sectional variation 
with factors that both increase truancy costs and are positively associated with these benefits 
will exaggerate the impact of education on these benefits.  
The approach taken in this paper draws on two main strands of the literature.  One 
strand, in the economics of education, addresses the effects of CSL on enrollment (Goldin 
and Katz, 2008; Lleras Muney, 2002; Landes and Solmon, 1972; Oreopoulos, 2006a) and 
employs  CSL  as  an  instrument  to  identify  the  effects  of  education  on  various  outcomes 
(Angrist and Krueger, 1991, Angrist et al., 1996, Imbens and Angrist, 1994, Black et al., 
2005, 2008; Dee, 2004, Lleras Muney, 2002, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2006b, 2008, Oreopoulos et 
al., 2006). The other strand, in the economics of crime, emphasizes the role of social norms in 
inducing legal compliance (Calvo-Armengol and Zenou, 2004; Case and Katz, 1991; Glaeser 
et al., 1996; Sah, 1991; Patacchini and Zenou, 2008). Incorporating the insights of this latter 
strand of the literature in a model of CSL contributes to a better understanding of what CSL 
achieves and to a clearer interpretation of its use as an instrumental variable to identify the 
benefits of education. 
Section  2  outlines  the  basic  model;  Section  3  characterizes  its  equilibrium  and 
discusses its implications; and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider the following two-period model of a community with a continuum of families of 
measure one, each family consisting of a parent and child. Families are differentiated by their 
initial income yi, the distribution of which is characterized by the cumulative distribution   7  
function F; and we assume that income is bounded from below by a minimal value yL. 
  The community’s democratic government determines a level of compulsory schooling, 
e, which is supplied by a public school system and funded by a poll tax of T per family.  We 
assume  for  simplicity  that  there  is  no  free  schooling  beyond  the  compulsory  level  and 
families  cannot  privately  “top  up”  public  schooling.  We  further  assume  that  costs  are 
determined by the level of compulsory schooling rather than by actual attendance rates; this 
holds, for example, if non-compliance takes the form of partial attendance over the school 
year. Let p denote the unit price of education, and assume a balanced government budget. 
Then as each household has one child and shares equally in the cost of education, we have  T  
=   p e .    
  Each child is endowed with a unit of time, which the parent allocates between school 
attendance hi, and work, 1 – hi , where 0 < hi < e . Letting w denote the wage rate for child 
labor, w (1 – hi) is the family income generated by the child’s work, and family consumption 
ci  is equal to net income, 
   
  ci   =   yi  –  p e  +  w ( 1 – hi )    (1) 
 
  Parents derive utility from consumption, ci; from their children’s education, hi and from 
a positive external benefit generated by the general level of education in the child’s cohort, H 
=   ∫i  hi  di  ;  and  they  suffer  a  loss  of  utility  from  truancy,  which  is  proportional  to  the 
difference e – hi between the mandated level of schooling and the family’s chosen level of 
school attendance:  
 
  U ( ci, hi, H )   =   v(ci)  +  hi  +  γ H  –   k (e – hi)    (2)   8  
 
where v is an increasing concave function of consumption (v′ > 0 ,  v″ < 0) and γ and k are 
positive constants. The utility loss that society imposes on those who do not comply with the 
law might take the form of social exclusion, a notion common in theories of crime (Akers, 
1998),  developed  in  Sah’s  (1991)  theoretical  model  of  crime  determined  by  social 
conventions, and supported by Case and Katz’s (1991) empirical evidence, which shows how 
both criminal and educational choices are affected by peer pressure.
7 We will refer to k as the 
community’s norm of compliance. Using (1) to substitute for ci  in (2) gives: 
 
  U ( ci, hi, H )   =   v (yi  –  p e  +  w (1 – hi ))  +  hi  +  γ H  –  k (e – hi)    (3) 
 
  We  assume  that  parents  first  determine,  through  majority  voting,  the  level  of 
compulsory schooling e.  Then each household sets its level of school attendance hi so as to 
maximize its utility given the compulsory level e.  In voting on the compulsory level of 
schooling, households base their votes on their anticipation of their own choice of hi and on 
the average level of school attendance, H.  In equilibrium, the chosen level of compulsory 
schooling is weakly preferred to any other level by a majority of families and the anticipated 
school attendance levels on which voting decisions were based conform to actual choices. 
 
3. Analysis 
The analysis proceeds backwards, starting with the determination of school attendance after 
the compulsory school level has been set. 
   9  
3.1. School attendance  
To characterize school attendance, we take the derivative of utility (3) with respect to school 
attendance,  hi,  to  obtain  the  first-order  condition  which  an  optimal  choice  of  school 
attendance must satisfy. At an optimal choice one of the following must hold:  
Either 
  
  –v'(yi – p e  +  w(1 –  hi)) w  +  1  +  k  =  0       (4a)  
 
for some attendance level 0  <  hi  < e , which is then optimal (and  family i is truant); or
8 
 
  –v'(yi –  p e  +  w(1 –  e)) w  +  1  +  k  >  0               (4b) 
 
in which case  hi  =  e is optimal (and family i is not truant);  or 
 
  –v'(yi – p e  +  w) w  +  1  +  k  <  0                   (4c) 
 
in which case  hi  =  0 is optimal and the child does not attend school at all. For simplicity we 
exclude the third case, and assume that –v'(yi – p e  +  w) w  +  1  +  k  is always positive so 
that  the optimal choice of  hi is never zero. Taking the second derivative and recalling that v″ 
<  0  by  assumption,  we  find  that  the  second  order-condition  holds  throughout,  and  that 
household i is truant if and only if 
 
  –v'(yi – p e  +  w(1 –  e)) w  +  1  +  k  <  0       (5) 
   10  
  The strict concavity of v implies that v′ has a well-defined inverse function, which we 
denote g  and which is decreasing. When first-order conditions hold, g satisfies: 
 
  yi  –  p e +  w(1 –  hi) =   g ((1 + k) / w)   when  hi  <  e ;   and  (6a)  
 
  yi  –  p e  +  w(1 –  e)  >   g ((1 + k) / w)    when  hi  =  e .  (6b) 
 
Substituting this back into the budget constraint and isolating hi we obtain: 
 
  hi  =  max {e, [yi – p e + w – g((1 + k) / w)] / w}  (7) 
 
from which it follows that there is an income level y* above which parents fully comply with 
compulsory schooling laws and below which they choose some measure of truancy. It is 
given by: 
 
  y*   =    p e  –  w  +  g ((1 + k) / w)  +  w e    (8) 
 
The right-hand side of (8) is increasing in e and decreasing in k, implying that: 
 
Proposition 1: The proportion of truant families in the population increases with the level of 
compulsory schooling and decreases with society’s compliance norm. 
 
  Aggregating individual schooling choices we obtain the average level of schooling as a 
function of the level of compulsory schooling e and of the compliance norm k:   11  
 
  H ( e, k )  =  (1 / w)∫ + − + −
*
) ( )] / ) 1 (( [
y
yL
y dF w k g w pe y    +     [1 – F(y*)] e   (9) 
 
Differentiating H  with respect to e  we have:   
 






y dF p   –   F'(y*) (p + w) e  +  1 – F(y*)   +   F'(y*) (p+w) e  
                 =     – (p / w) F(y*)   +  1  –  F(y*)   (10) 
Thus if most households are not truant and the cost of education is no greater than the wages 
of  a  child’s  labor,  raising  the  compulsory  level  of  schooling  raises  the  average  level  of 
schooling.
 9 
  Taking the second differential of H with respect to e, and using (8) to differentiate y*, 
we note for future reference that H is a concave function of e: raising the level of compulsory 
schooling has a diminishing effect on the average level of schooling.  
 
  ∂ 
2H / ∂ e
2  =   – (1  +   p / w)  F′(y*)  dy* / de   =   – [(p + w)
2 / w] F′(y*)   <  0   (11) 
 
Finally, differentiating H with respect to k we find that average schooling increases with the 
compliance norm: 
 
∂H / ∂k =  – ∫
* y
yL
(g ' / w) dF(y)  +  F'(y*) e g '/ w  –  F'(y*) e g'/ w   >   0  (12) 
   12  
as the two last terms cancel out and the derivative of g is negative (it is the inverse function 
of v’, which is decreasing). Collecting results we have:
  
 
Proposition 2:  If most households are not truant and the cost of education is no greater than 
the wages of a child’s labor, then raising the compulsory level of schooling raises the average 
level  of  schooling.  The  magnitude  of  this  effect  diminishes  as  the  level  of  compulsory 
schooling rises. The average level of schooling increases with the compliance norm, k.  
 
3.2. Policy preferences 
We  next  characterize  the  community’s  political  decision  on  the  level  of  compulsory 
schooling  e.  Individual  preferences  over  compulsory  schooling  are  characterized  by 
differentiating the utility function (3) with respect to e to obtain first-order conditions, given 
anticipated attendance choices.  There are two possibilities. The first is that the household 
anticipates being truant if its choice of e is adopted. If this holds then applying the envelope 
theorem yields the first order condition:   
 
  ∂U / ∂e  =   – p v'(yi  –  p e  +  w(1 – hi))  –  k  +  γ ∂H / ∂e  =  0  (13) 
 
A solution then comprises values e and hi that satisfy (13) and (4a). Using (4a) to substitute 
(1  +  k ) / w   for   v'(yi – pe  +  w(1 –  hi))  in (13), it follows that an optimal choice of e in 
this case implies that the external benefits of the average level of schooling balance out a 
term that increases with the compliance norm:  
 
  p (1  +  k ) / w  +  k   =  γ  ∂H /  ∂e    (14)   13  
 
We assume that this is never the case, i.e., that truancy costs for the individual household are 
large in comparison to the external benefits of the average level of schooling (that k is large 
in comparison to γ ) so that no household ever prefers a level of compulsory schooling under 
which it will choose to be truant itself. 
  For a household that anticipates not being truant if its choice of e is implemented, the 
first-order condition characterizing its optimal choice of e is obtained by substituting e for hi 
in (3) and differentiating U with respect to e :  
 
  ∂U / ∂e  =   – (p + w) v'(yi  – p e +  w(1 – e))  +  1  +  γ ∂H / ∂e  =   0  (15) 
 




2  =   (p + w)
 2 v″ (yi  – p e +  w(1 – e))  +  γ ∂
2H / ∂e
2  <  0
  (16) 
 
Total differentiation of (15) with respect to e  and y then yields: 
 
  d e / d y =  (p + w) v” / ∂
2U / ∂e
2   >  0  (17) 
 
The  choice  of  e  is  monotonically  increasing  in  household  income.  This  implies  that 
preferences are single crossing (Gans and Smart, 1996), so that a political equilibrium exists 
and is given by the value of  e preferred by the median income household.  
 
Proposition 3. If the compliance norm, k, is large in comparison to the marginal external   14  
benefit  of  average  schooling,  γ , then  a  majority  voting  equilibrium  exists  in  which  the 
median income household is decisive and non-truant, and the majority of the population is 
non-truant. The chosen level of compulsory schooling is implicitly determined by (15) with yi 
equal to median income. 
 
  Denote the equilibrium choice of compulsory schooling e*. It follows directly from our 
analysis that e* increases in median household income. To see that e* is also increasing in k 
we take the total differential of (15) with respect to e and k, obtaining 
 
  d e / d y = – (∂
2U / ∂e ∂k) / (∂
2U / ∂e
2) = – γ ( ∂
 2H / ∂e ∂k) / (∂
2U / ∂e
2)    (18) 
 
which  has  the  same  sign  as  ∂
2H  /  ∂e  ∂k  ,    as  ∂
2U  /  ∂e
2  is  negative  from  (16).  Then 










*) ( ′ +









+ ′ ′ +
−  >  0  (19)  
 
where the inequality holds because g is decreasing. We thus obtain: 
 
Proposition  4.    The  equilibrium  compulsory  schooling  level  e*  is  increasing  in  median 
household income and in the compliance norm k. 
   15  
 
4. Discussion: Implications and extensions 
We consider now two implications of the model for empirical analysis. The first relates to 
estimates of the effect of CSL on enrollment; the second to the use of CSL as an instrument 
to identify the benefits of education. 
 
4.1 Estimating the effect of CSL on enrollment  
There are different ways of using the model to understand the effect of CSL on enrollment. 
The simplest, most straightforward, is to follow the model in identifying public schooling 
with compulsory schooling and vary its level, that is, to examine the effect of the level of 
compulsory schooling, e, on average enrollment, H. From (10) this effect is positive and from 
(19) it increases with the compliance norm k. Thus if there is variation in compliance norms 
among observations that is not accounted for in empirical estimation this may introduce a 
bias in the empirical estimates of the effect of compulsory schooling legislation (CSL) on 
actual enrollment rates. This is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case that compliance norms are 
stricter in more affluent societies, which also legislate higher levels of compulsory schooling. 
The horizontal axis is e, the level of CSL; the vertical axis represents the level of enrollment. 
Solid lines represent the effect of CSL on enrollment for a given compliance norm. The two 
observations  A  and  B,  from  different  communities  (or  different  times),  are  situated  on 
different lines, the higher line corresponding to higher income and larger values of k and e. 
The slope of the broken line represents the estimated effect of CSL on enrollment, and it is 
clearly steeper than the effect of raising the level of compulsory schooling while holding k 
constant.  This  suggests  that  if  more  affluent  societies  typically  legislate  higher  levels  of 
compulsory schooling and are characterized by stricter norms of compliance with the law   16  
then the estimated effect of CSL on enrollment may be upwardly biased. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
  
  A different interpretation of the effect of compulsory schooling on enrollment might 
consider the implication of imposing a requirement for compulsory attendance on free public 
schooling offered without compulsion. This would be represented in the model by a jump in k 
when compulsion is imposed, so that sending one’s child out to work instead of to school 
becomes a violation of the law. Then comparing enrollment between two points in time, 
before and after schooling becomes compulsory, provides an estimate of the effect of CSL on 
enrollment  (Figure  2).  CSL  causes  a  jump  in  k  which  causes  a  discontinuous  rise  in 
enrollment through two channels: the direct positive effect of k on H , shown in equation (12) 
and an indirect positive effect (through the positive effect of  k on  e and the positive effect of 
e  on  H) , which in practice might take longer to take effect. At the same time, there are 
likely to be secular changes in income and social norms that cause enrollment to increase 
independently of the change in CSL. The possibility of separating these various effects and 
thus  identifying  the  specific  effect  of  CSL  on  enrollment  depends  on  their  size,  on  the 
precision and frequency with which enrollment is measured, and on the method of analysis. 
Empirical findings suggest that the effect of CSL on enrollment is generally not large. This 
might explain why studies of CSL in the nineteenth century (Landes and Solmon, 1972; 
West, 1978), which had access to very limited data, failed to pick up such an effect, while 
studies of later periods (Oreopoulos, 2006a; Goldin and Katz, 2008; Lleras Muney, 2002), 
which had access to much richer data were able to focus more sharply on the discontinuities 
of CSL and thus identify statistically significant effects.   17  
 
4.2 Using CSL as an instrument to identify the benefits of schooling  
This in itself has implications for the use of CSL as an instrumental variable for identifying 
the benefits of education, as its strength as an instrument hinges on the extent in which its 
effect  on  enrollment  can  be  sharply  identified.  In  addition,  our  analysis  indicates  that 
estimates obtained in this way may be biased, if systematic variation in k is correlated, say, 
with unobserved variables that affect the benefits of schooling (such as respect for the law); 
and the degree of bias increases with the extent of non-compliance (Angrist et al., 1996, 
Proposition 2).  
  More generally, as Angrist et al. (1996) emphasize, the effect that CSL identifies is the 
local average treatment effect (LATE)—the effect of compulsory schooling on compliers. If 
this is not a randomly selected group, we need to understand and be able to identify, through 
observable variables, the economic and social conditions that shape compliance in order to 
obtain  economically  meaningful  results  that  can  be  applied  in  a  wider  context.  Such  a 
characterization could be modeled through a simple extension of the framework described in 
this paper, which allowed for variation across households in the marginal social penalty for 
non-compliance, denoted by k.   
 
4.3 Extensions 
Extensions  of  the  model  could  make  explicit  some  of  the  ideas  raised  in  the  preceding 
discussion. One set of extensions would address the endogenization of compliance norms, 
allowing for variation over time and across individuals, for example in the manner suggested 
by the literature on social interactions (Glaeser et al., 1996, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou, 
2004). If parents derive disutility from their children’s truancy deviating from the community   18  
norm, given, say, by the average degree of compliance, we could have: 
  
  δ [(e – hi) – (e – H)] = δ (H – hi)   (20) 
 
as the disutility cost.  It can be seen that adding this element does not qualitatively change the 
utility  specification,  so  that  the  analysis  goes  through  with  this  alternative  interpretation.  
Glaeser et al., 1996, show that legal compliance is strongly affected by social interactions, 
consequently exhibiting significant variability across locations. Alternatively, one could have 
the shame associated with truancy increasing with income or with parental education, or with 
characteristics that are more difficult to observe such as religiosity or respect for the rule of 
law.  The  ability  to  observe  the  correlates  of  the  propensity  to  comply  are  essential  for 
controlling the bias they introduce. 
  Another possible direction for extending the analysis would be to allow an explicit 
distinction between free and compulsory schooling, as well as private schooling, either in 
addition to public schooling or as an alternative. These extensions raise issues of existence of 
a political equilibrium. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Compulsory schooling legislation has been the focus of many recent studies, some aimed at 
assessing its effect on actual schooling and some using it as an instrument to identify the 
effect  of  education  on  individual  social  and  economic  outcomes.  These  studies  typically 
ignore the endogeneity of such legislation as well as issues of enforcement and compliance.  
This paper presents a simple political economy model that endogenizes both legislation and 
compliance.    19  
  Analysis  of  the  model  indicates  that  in  equilibrium  both  the  legislated  level  of 
compulsory  schooling  and  the  actual  level  of  schooling  increase  with  the  severity  of  the 
social penalties for non-compliance.  This implies that if the severity of these penalties is 
correlated with other community characteristics  that affect legislation—such as income—
econometric  estimates  of  the  effect  of  legislation  on  educational  attainment  that  do  not 
account for variation in compliance norms may be biased. If there is a positive correlation 
between autonomous increases in social penalties and other community characteristics that 
work  to  raise  the  legislated  level  of  compulsory  schooling,  such  estimates  are  upwardly 
biased. The model also highlights the difficulty of separating the effect of CSL on enrollment 
from secular increases driven by rising incomes and changing social norms, suggesting why 
studies of more recent  changes in CSL were  more successful in identifying a significant 
effect on enrolment than historical studies of earlier periods.  
  Our analysis also has implications for the use of compulsory schooling legislation as an 
instrumental variable for identifying the local average treatment effect (LATE) of education, 
that  is,  the  benefits  of  schooling  for  compliers  with  compulsory  schooling  legislation.  It 
highlights the need to understand and be able to identify, through observable variables, the 
economic and social conditions that shape compliance, in order to interpret these estimates 
and apply them in a more general context. Absent such an identification, if the severity of 
social  penalties  varies  systematically  across  households  in  a  manner  that  correlates  with 
unobservable factors that affect the future economic and social outcomes of their children, 
instrumental variable estimates based on CSL will be biased.    20  
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1 Angrist and Krueger (1991), Angrist et al. (1996), Imbens and Angrist (1994), Black et al. 
(2005,  2008);  Dee  (2004),  Lleras  Muney  (2002,  2005),  Oreopoulos  (2006b,  2008), 
Oreopoulos (2006), among others. 
2  A  possible  exception  is  the  1947  reform  in  Britain,  enacted  in  1944,  which  raised  the 
school-leaving  age  from  14  to  15,  and  which  was  followed  by  a  substantial  increase  in 
enrolment  in  the  affected  age  group.  Interestingly,  as  Devereux  and  Hart  (2008)  note, 
“researchers have struggled to find strong effects” of the 1947 reform on a wide range of 
individual  outcomes  and  their  own  careful  study  of  its  effect  on  income  reaches  similar 
conclusions. Edwards’ (1978) study of the effect of compulsory schooling legislation in the 
United States in 1940-60 failed to find significant effects. 
3 Changes that increased demand for education, such as its increased economic importance, 
do  not  directly  explain  greater  compliance  as  they  also  work  to  increase  the  extent  of 
compulsory  education.  Low levels of compliance arise when the median voter  wants the 
children of the poor to attend school more than their parents want them to attend. 
4 Of course, these explanations are not mutually exclusive.  
5 There is another related signaling effect, which we do not model, that should work in the 
same direction. The negative signaling effect on income of not attending schooling beyond 
the compulsory level should be weaker than the signaling effect of not fulfilling compulsory 
schooling requirements both because being raised in a household that was not law-abiding 
may  in  itself  be  a  negative  signal  for  future  employers;  and  because  CSL  increases  the 
fraction of children in the cohort attending school.  
6 Modern analyses emphasize the economic external benefits of education but earlier writings 
saw in the education of the poor a moral imperative and a means of promoting public order.   25  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
7  In  closely  related  work,  Patacchini  and  Zenou  (2008)  distinguish  between  the  roles  of 
deterrence and social pressure in inhibiting criminal behavior. 
8 The marginal increase in utility in reducing h below e, which is w v′ – k  per unit of h, is less 
than the marginal loss of utility from the same reduction of h, which is 1. 
9  Progressive  taxation  further  weakens  the  conditions  that  ensure  increasing  compulsory 
schooling will raise the average schooling level. The perverse effect arises in the model as a 
result of regressive taxes (that place an equal burden on rich and poor) having an adverse 
income effect on the schooling decisions of poorer parents when compulsory schooling is 
extended. These parents then choose to increase truancy so as to compensate for the tax 
increase and consequent loss of income for consumption. When such parents are a large 
fraction of the population this adverse effect may outweigh the added schooling in families 
that are not truant in the aggregate.  